Abstract: We explore the potential effects of board voting efficiency on corporate performance and governance. In the absence of detailed data on board voting, we adopt a novel approach that focuses on the differences between boards with an even and with an odd number of directors. Analysis of a simple voting model shows that in comparison to even boards, odd boards improve voting efficiency by better aggregating directors’ information. Consistent with this prediction, our empirical analysis reveals that firms derive higher Tobin’s Q and operating performance, exhibit stronger Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover-performance sensitivity, and have higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity, when they have an odd board than when they have an even board. Taken together, our findings suggest that enhanced board voting efficiency improve corporate performance and governance.
主讲人介绍：邓辛,上海财经大学金融学院副教授，南洋理工大学金融学博士。邓辛博士的研究领域包括公司金融、公司财务等。邓辛博士曾经在国际顶级期刊Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis发表论文。邓辛博士是多个国际知名期刊匿名审稿人。
时间：2014年11月28日 星期五 15:30-17:00
TOPIC: Does Board Voting Efficiency Affect Corporate Performance and Governance? Evidence from the Even-Odd Effects of Corporate Board
Speaker: Deng Xin, Associate Professor, School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Dr. Deng obtained her PhD in Finance from Nanyang Technological University. Deng’s primary research fields include Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance. Dr. Deng’s research papers have been published at top journals such as Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Dr. Deng also served as a referee for many influential academic journals.
Time: Friday, November 28th, 2014, 3:30-5:00 pm
Place: Room604, Academic Hall
Organizer: The Chinese Academy of Finance and Development
